After U.S. raid on Maduro, Venezuela teeters between fear and a tentative economic reset

Thirty days after a U.S. operation that led to Nicolás Maduro’s removal, Venezuelans live with a volatile mix of anxiety and cautious expectation. The interim authorities, with Delcy Rodríguez in a leading role, have publicly asserted control while signaling willingness to cooperate with Washington — a break from decades of Chavista orthodoxy that has produced rapid policy moves, including a legislative overhaul to open the oil sector to private and mixed investment. Washington has taken concrete steps in parallel: officials reportedly allowed an initial sale of previously sanctioned barrels, estimated at roughly $500 million, with proceeds placed in accounts overseen by U.S. authorities as a conditional liquidity mechanism for transitional managers. Venezuelan output at the time of the operation was about 800,000 barrels per day, a fraction of past capacity, meaning any meaningful export recovery will demand deep technical rehabilitation and sustained capital. U.S. diplomats are beginning a calibrated return — temporary consular services and a phased presence marked by the deployment of officials to Caracas — while intelligence planners prepare a limited liaison and vetting footprint to assess emergent actors and security risks. Those moves increase leverage but also stoke nationalist fears and questions about sovereignty, amplified by maritime enforcement actions and related civilian‑casualty litigation that critics cite when weighing U.S. intentions. On the ground, ordinary Venezuelans recount trauma from the raid’s violence and many continue to self‑censor; supporters of the old order view the interim’s cooperation with Washington as betrayal, and opposition figures worry about who will benefit from rapid privatization. Economic life shows both immediate relief and deep limits: dollarized transactions have expanded and the conditional dollar inflows ease short‑term cash needs, but Venezuelan banks cannot fully intermediate dollars and wages and pensions remain effectively bolívar‑indexed, constraining broad recovery. Diaspora communities and oil‑sector veterans — in places such as Houston — register both commercial interest and practical caution, emphasizing legal protections, predictable fiscal terms and the return of skilled technicians as prerequisites for investment. The interim government’s promise to channel oil revenues toward stabilization could provide fiscal breathing room, but absent transparent revenue management, credible security guarantees and robust institutional reform, gains risk being captured by a narrow elite or proving ephemeral. The coming months will test whether policy shifts and conditional U.S. support translate into measurable recovery or simply reconfigure existing power dynamics under new labels.