Seven plausible trajectories after a potential US strike on Iran

A US military strike on Iran would not yield a single predictable end-state but a set of plausible trajectories shaped by operational choices and political dynamics. A narrowly scoped campaign targeting military and nuclear infrastructure could achieve limited tactical effects while attempting to limit civilian harm, yet such an outcome would not guarantee political change in Tehran. Conversely, strikes risk consolidating power in security organs and the IRGC, empowering hardline commanders and narrowing prospects for moderation. Iran possesses a varied asymmetric toolkit—missiles, drones, proxy networks, mine-laying and small-boat swarm tactics—that makes calibrated retaliation likely and hard to confine to a single front. Recent developments alter these dynamics: the US has visibly increased its regional footprint (including redeployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and multi-day CENTCOM aviation exercises), open-source imagery and tracking have shown expanded logistics and ISR assets, and several Gulf states have privately limited basing or airspace access for offensive operations — all of which compress decision windows and raise the probability of miscalculation or accidental incidents. Iran’s acute domestic pressures — a harsh security crackdown, rising casualties and a collapsing rial — constrain Tehran’s strategic options and increase the political value of retaliatory signaling to a domestic audience. Markets have already reacted to heightened tension: short-term risk premia lifted crude prices and prompted insurers and shippers to begin contingency planning. Maritime interdiction through mine-laying, drone attacks or disruption to the Strait of Hormuz would have immediate effects on freight, insurance and hydrocarbon prices; even intermittent harassment could produce outsized economic pain. In the extreme, erosion of central authority could spark internal conflict, large refugee flows and a prolonged humanitarian emergency with regional spillover. The combined effect of a visible US force posture and Tehran’s internal fragility means contingency planning is urgent: harden forward bases and partner infrastructure, scale maritime security and escorts, prepare humanitarian responses, and intensify diplomatic channels to create pathways for de-escalation. Policymakers must weigh limited tactical gains against high strategic uncertainty and the real possibility that short-term coercive moves entrench the very behaviors they seek to change.