Ecopetrol blocked from importing Venezuelan gas after U.S. licensing hurdle

Colombia faces an immediate energy squeeze as its state producer, Ecopetrol, cannot legally receive pipeline shipments from Venezuela without explicit permission from the U.S. Treasury unit that enforces sanctions, OFAC. Officials from President Gustavo Petro’s administration recently traveled to Caracas to fast-track deliveries meant to relieve a widening shortfall in fuel used by factories and households; the delegation returned having advanced concrete technical and infrastructural steps but not having secured the necessary U.S. authorization.

The Caracas talks moved beyond high‑level declarations: participants agreed follow‑up technical sessions, inspection schedules, and a preliminary mapping of pipeline upgrades and power‑transmission works needed to scale reliable cross‑border flows. Colombia led the team from Bogotá while Venezuela’s representation at senior political levels signalled stronger backing for rapid implementation — but those domestic and bilateral commitments cannot overcome extraterritorial licensing requirements.

Washington has in recent months used a calibrated licensing approach to permit selected commercial activity in Venezuela’s oil sector under strict conditions — including oversight, escrow‑style routing of proceeds and reporting — which shows a potential legal pathway for limited shipments. U.S. officials have previously overseen constrained transactions (reportedly including a sanctioned‑barrel sale routed under American oversight that generated about $500 million) that provided short‑term liquidity while preserving leverage. However, these mechanisms come with monitoring, banking and insurer constraints that limit the speed and scale of flows.

Even if OFAC moves to issue a targeted license for Ecopetrol, physical and commercial integration will take additional time: synchronized metering, commercial contracts, safety certifications and coordinated inspections typically take weeks to finalize. Financing and insurance frictions — and private counterparties’ demand for legal guarantees against secondary‑sanctions exposure — further slow any immediate ramp‑up.

In practical terms, the licensing gap forces Bogotá toward costlier stopgaps: expanded spot LNG purchases, emergency rationing plans for industrial clients, and potential domestic price adjustments — each carrying fiscal and political costs for a government sensitive to energy affordability. The bilateral infrastructure agenda may lower medium‑term risks but cannot substitute for the third‑party clearance that OFAC control imposes.

Politically, the standoff reallocates leverage. By retaining licensing authority, Washington holds an asymmetric on/off influence over flows; Caracas, by contrast, gains a negotiable asset in the short term. The episode thus exemplifies a recurring pattern in the region: extraterritorial sanction mechanisms channel ostensibly bilateral energy solutions through multilateral permissioning, reshaping bargaining dynamics among Bogotá, Caracas and Washington.

Operationally, officials signalled next steps: delineated timelines for pipeline and grid works, inspection and metering protocols, and a negotiating track to align commercial contracts — but each milestone remains contingent on the licensing decision and on third‑party financial and insurance actors’ willingness to reengage under monitorable terms.

For Colombian policymakers the immediate trade‑off is stark: press Washington for expedited, conditional licensing and preserve diplomatic capital, or default to more expensive and politically visible domestic contingency measures that deliver faster but at higher cost. Markets and regional buyers will watch closely; a protracted delay could incentivize Venezuela to use export access as a bargaining chip and prompt other Latin American actors to reassess supply exposure to sanction‑dependent channels.

In short, the shortfall is not merely technical — it is a sanction‑governance bottleneck coupled with contractual, financing and infrastructure readiness issues, meaning that even with diplomatic momentum the fastest route to meaningful deliveries depends as much on U.S. policy design and private sector risk tolerance as on Bogotá‑Caracas cooperation.