Hungary’s Russian crude buys lift MOL profits while consumers pay more, CSD says

A fresh policy analysis finds that Hungary’s reliance on discounted Russian crude has enriched its dominant oil company rather than reduced pump prices for citizens. The paper shows consumer fuel costs were clearly above regional peers in 2025, even as crude purchases from Russia carried sizable discounts and MOL’s refinery-to-retail margins expanded sharply since 2022.

Researchers compared supply routes and refinery compatibility and concluded logistics do not force Hungary to buy from Russia. Pipeline connections to the Adriatic and existing refinery configurations can handle non-Russian barrels. The contrast with the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, which abandoned Russian crude without supply disruption, underpins the report’s claim that the choice to keep buying is political and commercial, not technical.

The analysis links the profit windfall at Hungary’s largest oil group to pricing behavior after import, arguing that savings on feedstock were largely retained as excess margin. The authors map how these extra profits flow into entities tied to the governing coalition, amplifying concerns about state-influence networks and political economy effects ahead of national elections.

• Operating income change: 30% increase since 2022
• Russian share of crude imports: ~92% in 2025 (up from ~61% pre-2022)
• Russian crude discount: ~20% cheaper Jan 2024–Aug 2025
• Fuel price gap: average weekly pre-tax petrol 18% higher vs Czech Republic (2025); diesel 10% higher
• Transit fee comparison: Adria pipeline transit fees about 1.7x cheaper than Druzhba

Those numerical contrasts frame the core allegation: discounted inputs did not translate into lower retail pricing. Instead, margin retention at refinery and wholesale levels widened, producing measurable gains for the supplier while end users bore higher costs than comparable EU markets.

The paper also documents that Hungary’s refineries are technically able to process non-Russian grades and have done so in the past without interruption. It highlights alternative logistics—Adria pipeline access and Adriatic imports—that offer capacity and lower transit fees relative to Druzhba, weakening the ‘landlocked necessity’ rationale.

The report’s findings have taken on renewed urgency after a reported strike on the Ukrainian stretch of the Druzhba pipeline at the end of January forced a suspension of deliveries along that corridor. The disruption created an immediate shortfall for Hungarian refineries and prompted emergency diplomacy: Budapest formally asked Croatia to enable temporary shipments through the Adriatic corridor to keep downstream fuel supplies flowing. Operators warned that redirecting flows would require contract and scheduling adjustments, tank and terminal capacity and confirmation of crude grade compatibility, but it also illustrated that practical alternatives to Druzhba exist when political will and regional cooperation are in play.

Taken together, the CSD argues the recent operational shock and the availability of Adriatic alternatives both reinforce the report’s central claim: continued dependence on discounted Russian crude is a policy choice with distributive consequences. The authors call on EU institutions to close exemption routes and consider targeted measures — including a ban for Hungary and Slovakia — to remove the sanction loophole and shift the balance of economic benefit away from concentrated domestic actors ahead of April’s parliamentary vote.