NATO urged to shift burden to Europe after US defence secretary’s absence

A symbolic no-show by the United States’ defence secretary at this week’s NATO defence ministers’ meeting in Brussels crystallised an already‑intense debate over transatlantic burden‑sharing and alliance credibility. Washington sent its deputy to participate, ensuring operational continuity, but ministers from several capitals treated the absence as a political cue to accelerate European capacity building and to demand clearer US reassurance. Germany’s defence leadership framed the moment as consistent with national steps to boost military spending and with a gradual reorientation toward stronger European contributions to regional defence. Smaller northern members used the meeting to spotlight vulnerabilities in the high north and to press for concrete deterrence measures; in response NATO unveiled a new Arctic‑focused mission intended to strengthen protection and signal resolve against growing Russian and Chinese activity. The gathering took place against a backdrop of diplomatic friction — notably public rows and private back‑channel talks tied to comments about Greenland — that analysts say have left reputational scars and dented some allied public sentiment toward Washington. Dutch prime ministerial warnings about Europe’s limited industrial and fiscal capacity to substitute for US guarantees resurfaced at the meeting, underlining the scale of investment and political trade‑offs required for genuine strategic autonomy. Allies also discussed longer‑running plans to rebalance operational command roles within NATO, shifting day‑to‑day leadership of some joint force commands toward European officers while retaining US leadership of the alliance’s top military post — a change designed to share responsibility while preserving overarching US assurance. Officials stressed that the new Arctic mission and command adjustments are gradual and operationally managed to avoid capability gaps, but they acknowledged transitional risks around interoperability, logistics and national caveats. For European capitals the episode reinforces arguments for accelerated procurement, defence‑industrial cooperation and joint planning; for Washington it is a reminder that managing domestic priorities and public diplomacy matters for alliance cohesion. The immediate operational risk to NATO deterrence appears limited given continued US representation and ongoing exercises, but the political symbolism of absent senior officials feeds narratives about drift that adversaries can exploit. Over the coming months expect policy papers, budget submissions and bilateral talks to invoke the meeting as a rationale for faster capability delivery, while allied diplomats work to patch trust frictions and ensure that signaling — not just hardware — keeps deterrence credible. Whether this episode yields permanent shifts in alliance architecture will depend on the pace at which European military investment converts into deployable capability and on sustained, visible US political commitments.