Trump-era strategy reshapes transatlantic security ahead of Munich talks

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, a recalibration of U.S. priorities is forcing European governments to rethink long‑standing assumptions about transatlantic security. The U.S. National Security Strategy and a pattern of more transactional diplomacy have signalled to allies that Europe will be expected to shoulder a larger share of defence responsibility, prompting urgent debates in capitals about timelines and the political cost of true strategic autonomy. Practical strains have coalesced around several concrete flashpoints: the diplomatic fallout from provocative rhetoric about Greenland, mixed public comments and modest U.S. troop posture adjustments near the Ukrainian frontier, and tariff and trade frictions that complicate cooperation. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s public warning that Europe currently lacks the industrial, fiscal and even nuclear capabilities to replace American guarantees crystallised the scale of the problem for policymakers weighing the trade‑offs of independence. Economic interdependence complicates any rapid decoupling: the transatlantic corridor remained worth roughly €1.68 trillion in 2024, while U.S. liquefied natural gas supplied about a quarter of EU gas needs last year, creating both leverage and logistical lock‑ins. The Greenland episode, though partially diffused by professional back‑channel talks between U.S., Danish and Greenlandic officials, left reputational scars and measurable drops in favourable views of the United States across parts of the EU, underscoring how symbolic moves can have lasting political effects. In response, European institutions and national governments are pursuing a two‑track approach: speed up procurement and defence‑industrial cooperation where feasible, and implement hedging measures — diversified suppliers, increased storage, logistics redundancy and stockpiling for critical inputs — to reduce vulnerabilities. Many capitals and Ottawa have pledged higher defence outlays bundled with infrastructure and resilience investments through 2035, but analysts stress that converting budgets into deployable capabilities will take years and leave a strategic window during which adversaries could test resolve below the threshold of full war. Restoring credible deterrence will therefore demand clearer, sustained U.S. political commitments alongside visible joint exercises and messaging, even as Brussels explores regulatory tools and joint procurement to lock in allied supply chains for critical minerals and technology. The immediate purpose of the Munich gathering is less to announce sweeping new commitments than to clarify whether the transatlantic compact can be renegotiated under these altered assumptions: will the allies align around concrete assurance measures and accelerated capability delivery, or will Europe accept a prolonged period of hedging, regionalization and higher costs to buy autonomy? The outcome will shape defence planning, diplomatic signalling and economic policy for the rest of the decade.