U.S. pressure throttles Cuba’s fuel supply to roughly two weeks

Cuba is confronting an acute fuel crunch after measures tied to recent U.S. policy moves disrupted its access to imported refined oil, leaving reserves that analysts estimate to cover only about two to three weeks of normal consumption. The shortage is already producing near-term operational pressure on transport, electricity generation and other essential services that depend on regular deliveries. On the supply side, heightened enforcement, threatened secondary sanctions and tightened banking and insurance links have narrowed payment channels and shipping options for firms that long moved product to Havana. Suppliers and intermediary states have responded with greater risk aversion; most recently, Mexico announced it would not proceed with a previously arranged shipment to Cuba, a concrete example of how diplomatic caution and U.S. scrutiny can translate into lost cargoes. For Cuba, which lacks domestic refining capacity to replace imported finished fuels quickly, the immediate task is triage: prioritise power plants, hospitals and essential transport while curbing nonessential commercial use. The squeeze threatens tourism revenue and industrial output, and raises the prospect of blackouts and transport disruptions that could sharpen social discontent. Regionally, the episode tests relationships between Havana and governments that have supplied or subsidised fuel in the past and signals that politically sensitive shipments can be withdrawn to avoid bilateral friction with Washington. Operationally, the role of insurers, banks and shipowners is decisive — even if political willingness re-emerges, logistical actors' compliance decisions will determine how fast flows resume. Absent rapid legal or financial workarounds, Cuba may seek emergency barter arrangements, alternate payment mechanisms or assistance from sympathetic states, each carrying diplomatic and legal trade-offs. For external actors, responding to a humanitarian squeeze without undermining sanctions policy will require carefully scoped exemptions or risk-sharing solutions. Over the coming weeks the situation will hinge on whether third-party carriers and financiers recalibrate their risk tolerance and whether diplomatic channels can produce bridging mechanisms to stabilise supplies.