China's Nuclear Submarine Surge Outpaces U.S. Launches, IISS Analysis Warns

IISS satellite-based estimates show China launched more nuclear-powered submarines than the United States from 2021–2025: 10 launches versus 7, and approximately 79,000 tons of hulls compared with 55,500 tons for the US. This production surge narrows a historic numerical advantage and immediately raises pressure on US shipbuilding capacity, force posture, and deterrence in contested waters.

Beijing’s expansion centers on the northern Huludao facilities run by Bohai Shipbuilding, where the IISS counted at least two Type-094 SSBN launches and multiple new hulls. The PLA Navy’s nuclear launch tally over the five-year span also includes at least six guided-missile submarine (SSGN) frames capable of hosting vertical launch systems. Those VLS-equipped hulls create a dual-use threat: land-attack and anti-ship fires from undersea platforms, integrating with China’s shore-based strike rehearsals and new hypersonic/shorter-range missiles.

Quantity has increased faster than qualitative parity; experts still rate many Chinese designs behind Western boats on acoustic stealth and sensor integration. Yet in modern naval contests, greater numbers translate into operational friction for opposing fleets. The US advantage in quieting, training, and integrated ASW sensors persists, but attrition, deployment tempo, and a looming production shortfall reduce the margin that those qualitative strengths deliver.

Washington’s industrial constraints are visible in recent delivery rates and program slippages. US yards have averaged roughly 1.1–1.2 Virginia-class attack submarines per year since 2022, short of the intended 2-per-year goal. The Columbia-class strategic program is at least a year behind schedule, with first-in-class delivery deferred toward 2028, compounding near-term fleet availability gaps as older Los Angeles-class boats retire.

Analysts project a trough in US attack submarine numbers, with the force dipping toward 47 SSNs by 2030 and not recovering to roughly 50 until the early 2030s if build targets are met. Planned transfers of Virginia-class hulls to Australia under AUKUS could further constrain immediate US force growth. That combination of retirements, export commitments, and slow production creates a period of heightened operational strain for US and allied undersea forces.

For strategic stability, the most consequential change is the bolstering of China’s sea-based leg of nuclear deterrence. New SSBNs expand Beijing’s survivable launch options and complement its missiles and long-range aviation. Concurrent development plans for a next-generation Type-096 SSBN indicate Beijing’s intent to modernize strike-capable hulls through the 2020s into the 2030s, extending the strategic impact of current construction momentum.

Operationally, the PLA’s growing submarine inventory will require Western navies to rebalance assets toward persistent anti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness, and logistics for sustained patrols. Industrially, the US faces two levers: increase shipyard output and control demand by reprioritizing deployments and foreign transfers. Neither option is trivial; both carry budgetary, workforce, and schedule risks that will crystallize over the next five years.

Policymakers should view the IISS numbers as an early warning on force generation, not a substitute for capability assessments that include crew proficiency and acoustic signatures. Still, the numerical trend is clear: if current build rates persist, regional maritime balances will shift materially, and US allies will face harder choices on burden-sharing, forward basing, and procurement. The coming decade will test whether qualitative superiority can offset a rising quantitative challenge from China’s submarine industrial surge.