Sinokor’s tanker buying spree tightens global VLCC market

A recent wave of purchases and long time‑charters orchestrated by Seoul‑based Sinokor—via deals linked to an entity associated with shipping magnate Gianluigi Aponte—has rapidly concentrated ownership of roughly 120 very large crude carriers (VLCCs). By removing substantial hireable capacity from the spot pool, the program has helped send benchmark VLCC earnings above $120,000 per day, roughly four times levels from a month earlier, while supporting higher bids for time‑charters and resale prices for older tonnage.

The squeeze comes on top of broader, geopolitically induced changes to oil flows: sanctions, the repurposing of fleets to carry Venezuelan and redirected Russian barrels, and longer voyage patterns have raised tonne‑mile demand and absorbed vessels that previously served routine routes. Security concerns and cautious return‑to‑service for the shortest Suez transits have further limited immediately available tonnage, so the Sinokor build‑out is tightening an already shallow market rather than creating the imbalance in isolation.

Industry brokers and owners estimate the combined effect equates to about 15% of the non‑sanctioned global tanker fleet and roughly 25–33% of VLCCs that were not otherwise committed — a concentration few market participants recall seeing. Reported deal values for the purchases and charters sit in the range of $1.5 billion to $3 billion, with some assets previously sold into Mediterranean Shipping Company affiliates cited in industry chatter.

Commercially, the immediate mechanics are clear: fewer hireable VLCCs mean higher spot and period rates, which in turn lift resale values for older vessels—especially the decade‑plus tonnage targeted in these transactions. Those higher asset prices are prompting fresh ordering activity; Clarkson Research and other data providers report newbuilding inquiries and contracts at multi‑year highs as owners seek to capture elevated returns, storing up the familiar boom‑and‑bust dynamics for years ahead.

For traders and refiners the combination of concentrated ownership and longer, diverted voyages raises basis risk and logistical uncertainty: higher and more volatile freight inflates delivered crude costs and can shift regional price spreads. The opaque commercial ties between Sinokor and Aponte‑linked entities also magnify counterparty and disclosure concerns for counterparties and charterers negotiating contracts in this tight market.

Policy and market‑structure risks are notable. Regulators and competition authorities may scrutinize concentration if access to traded capacity is materially impeded, while sanctions enforcement will continue shaping which ships are effectively available to mainstream markets. Conversely, a normalization of Suez transit patterns or a rapid redeployment of vessels away from redirected trades would be the fastest structural relief, though that outcome depends on security and commercial willingness to resume shorter routings.

In the near to medium term, the market structure favors well‑capitalized owners and large traders who can control access to compliant tonnage; downstream players must adapt procurement and routing strategies to elevated transport costs and less predictable liftings. Ultimately, unless newbuild deliveries rise materially or some committed tonnage is redeployed, the current rate shock is likely to persist into 2026, with elevated earnings feeding both asset appreciation and increased ordering that could sow oversupply risks in later years.