U.S. training initiatives for a postwar Gaza police force collapse amid political and operational obstacles

In late 2023 U.S. planners sketched a blueprint to prevent a security vacuum in Gaza once large-scale combat operations ended, proposing trained Palestinian units paired with an international stabilization contingent. Implementation stumbled from the outset: training sites in neighboring countries proved scarce, vetting and selection were politically fraught, and partner nations raised concerns about arming or equipping forces that might be turned against Israel. The U.S. managed some capacity-building—roughly 700 West Bank officers received SWAT-style instruction in Jordan and about 100 Palestinians were trained in Egypt—but trainers judged the results uneven and the skills quickly eroded without sustained live-fire practice and refresher programs. Planners had envisioned months-long training cycles and larger cohorts taken out of Gaza for intensive preparation, but those timelines did not materialize at scale and the number of trained personnel remains far below operational requirements for Gaza. Meanwhile renewed debate over digital policing tools and forensic software resurfaced: advocates framed these systems as necessary to protect infrastructure and support investigations, while critics warned the same capabilities could be misused in ways that deepen repression. Political developments in the West Bank and Israel have further complicated the strategic premise: measures that weaken the Palestinian Authority and growing violence by settlers undermine the very local institutional partner that would be central to a transition. With no comprehensive police architecture on the ground, local militias and masked fighters have reasserted control in areas vacated by conventional forces, filling checkpoints and entrenching influence. International proposals for a peacekeeping-style force have attracted tentative interest from some states but remain undefined in numbers, mandates and contributors, and objections from Israeli leadership over potential participants have narrowed the field. The cumulative effect is a fragile, patchwork approach to stabilization that risks prolonging insecurity, impeding reconstruction funding, and creating enduring contestation over governance in Gaza. U.S. policymakers face a stark choice: scale a politically sensitive and resource-heavy program to field credible, accountable security units or accept a long-term presence of armed local groups and external military actors shaping order. Absent clear, mutually accepted authorities and transparent oversight, any new security arrangements will likely be contested from day one, complicating humanitarian access and longer-term political negotiations.