As orbital activity surges, space law risks falling out of orbit

The last decade has transformed space from a lightly governed domain into a dense operating environment where private capital, rapid iteration and renewed national ambitions collide with an ageing legal framework. Treaties drawn up when only a few states operated in orbit and private enterprise was marginal now struggle to address tens of thousands of planned satellites, proposals for orbital data centers and rising lunar activity. The surge includes both state-led programs — notably higher‑tempo Artemis operations and parallel large-scale initiatives led by China — and industry moves into orbital compute, edge processing, and proposals for large-scale power platforms and on‑orbit services. Those technical frontiers introduce novel regulatory pressure points: spectrum allocation and coordination, export controls and technology transfer, licensing for nuclear or fission power on the Moon, and liability for increasingly autonomous on‑orbit systems. The combination of commercial speed, investor incentives and national security priorities means private actors can set operational norms that outpace multilateral diplomacy. Where there is broad agreement — standardized deorbit procedures, interoperable traffic coordination, certification standards and clearer liability rules — no reliable international mechanism exists to turn that agreement into binding practice. One pragmatic remedy gaining traction among specialists is a recurring, multistakeholder forum that would meet regularly to negotiate incremental, operational norms and fast‑track technical standards rather than waiting for a single comprehensive treaty. Proponents argue such a process could produce low‑cost, high‑impact measures (communication protocols, end‑of‑life certification, cross‑border information sharing and export‑control harmonization) that reduce collision, debris and jurisdictional risk while accommodating commercial innovation. Critics point to the COP model’s weaknesses — lobbying influence, fragmented outcomes and slow political uptake — but supporters counter that many space governance challenges are procedural and technical, making them amenable to iterative solutions. The governance gap extends beyond orbit: interdependence with undersea cables, terrestrial networks and cyber systems means failures or attacks can cascade across weather, navigation and communications services, increasing the social and economic stakes of any policy failure. The political challenge is significant: divergent great‑power agendas, uneven regulatory capacity and competing commercial business models will complicate forum design and buy‑in. Nevertheless, delayed rule‑making raises the risk that accidents, contested resource claims or unilateral licensing decisions will lock in harmful precedents. The strategic choice facing governments, companies and investors is whether to invest now in institutional design and technical standards that keep pace with capability growth, or to accept a reactive scramble after a disruptive incident defines the operating rules for them.