Feingold: Unilateral Exit from Paris Frameworks Risks Constitutional and Climate Costs

Russ Feingold frames the administration’s decision to abandon international climate frameworks as not only a policy reversal but a constitutional rupture that concentrates foreign-affairs authority in the presidency and bypasses the Senate’s role in treaty governance. He contends that once the Senate has accepted an international regime, reversal should not be a unilateral executive act; allowing that precedent would erode the checks and balances designed to govern treaties and executive agreements. Feingold outlines multiple remedies: congressional resolutions to invalidate or limit the withdrawal, continued litigation to define the executive’s bounds, and even a proposed constitutional amendment to require shared congressional (including Senate) authority over treaty exit. Practically, the U.S. formal withdrawal will not be instantaneous—formal notification triggers a roughly one-year interval before it becomes effective, during which the U.S. can attend talks only in a diminished, observer-like capacity with sharply reduced negotiating influence. Legal and policy commentators note that rejoining is possible under future administrations—restoring UNFCCC party status is legally tractable in a matter of months after new ratification and the Paris Agreement itself can be recovered faster under certain procedural paths—yet procedural readmittance alone will not immediately repair reputational damage. The absence of a major economy at formal decision-making tables raises transaction costs for negotiations, weakens U.S. leverage in finance and rulemaking discussions, and hands influence to coalitions favoring weaker ambitions. At the same time, private-sector economics and subnational initiatives will continue to drive much clean-energy deployment: corporations, cities, and states are likely to sustain climate programs, and market-driven renewables growth will blunt some immediate emissions impacts. But federal withdrawal injects risk into long-lived infrastructure and investment decisions because investors and utilities require stable policy signals, monitoring regimes, and verification standards embedded in multilateral frameworks. That uncertainty increases financing costs and complicates planning for grid upgrades, capital allocation, and compliance pathways. International institutions, nonstate actors, and other governments may step in to fill gaps, yet they cannot fully substitute for coordinated engagement by a high-emitting country whose participation shapes rulemaking and finance flows. The political contest Feingold invites—between Congress, the courts, and the executive—will force clarifications about the legal boundary between executive agreements and ratified treaties, a contest with implications far beyond climate policy. Restoring credibility after withdrawal will demand more than procedural reentry: credible domestic policy changes, financed commitments, and active diplomacy will be necessary to rebuild trust. The dispute therefore accelerates a devolutionary dynamic in climate governance: loss of federal leadership will push responsibilities to states, cities, and businesses, producing uneven capacity and patchwork outcomes unless institutions act to reaffirm shared treaty authority and predictable frameworks.