Gen Z toppled an autocrat but Bangladesh’s older parties look set to regain control

A dramatic youth-led uprising delivered a sudden political rupture, removing a dominant leader and creating a fragile interim administration dominated in part by activists who had led mass protests. That achievement, achieved at heavy human cost, has not converted into coherent electoral strength; the transitory party formed by protest leaders is beset by internal splits and accusations of sidelining women. Facing an imminent national vote, older political machines have moved quickly to occupy the vacuum: an Islamist formation with deep organisational reach has gained ground on campuses and in constituencies, while the main opposition has repositioned itself as the chief alternative to the old regime. Strategic alliances and candidate lists released ahead of polling show a stark gender imbalance that contradicts the uprising’s egalitarian rhetoric and has prompted resignations from prominent female activists. The banned ruling party remains a potent shadow presence—its exclusion from the ballot raises questions about the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the contest and gives opponents a propaganda line to mobilise resistance. For voters who backed the uprising because it promised judicial reform, cleaner governance and new opportunities, the immediate outlook is sobering: pledges are plentiful, but delivery will require rebuilding institutional capacity and public trust. The Islamist party argues it offers anti-corruption measures and judicial independence, messages that resonate with parts of the electorate exhausted by decades of perceived impunity. University elections and student union victories suggest this group has rebuilt grassroots influence quickly, translating campus momentum into broader political traction. Meanwhile, the veteran opposition leans on its own networks and dynastic narrative to present stability and economic promise to voters wary of inexperience. The interim administration’s limited time and fractured base make it unlikely to set the long-term agenda without a clear electoral mandate. If the vote proceeds with major parties barred and boycotts threatened, the result could reinforce old power structures rather than entrench the uprising’s reforms. The coming election will therefore be less a test of the students’ revolution than a referendum on which established actors can best convert disruption into durable authority.