U.S. Cyber Command Secretly Targeted Russian Influence Network Ahead of 2024 Vote

In the months before the 2024 presidential contest, U.S. military cyber operators executed a covert campaign aimed at degrading pieces of a Russian influence apparatus that had been pushing fabricated news to voters in competitive states. The effort targeted the technical infrastructure and individuals tied to at least two companies the U.S. intelligence community tied to Kremlin-directed influence activity, including work routed through servers located in Europe. Officials briefed on the operation say the effort slowed content production and created operational friction for the trolls, though it did not fully halt their output before votes were cast. This clandestine intervention complemented public law-enforcement moves to seize web domains, representing a layered approach combining legal and secret cyber tools. At the same time, Washington is shrinking the institutional architecture built over recent years to detect and counter foreign influence: dedicated teams and centers inside the intelligence community, FBI, State Department and DHS have been pared back or closed. Election officials at the state and local level report diminished federal coordination and fewer no-cost services, forcing many jurisdictions to look for alternative support to secure voting systems and digital infrastructure. The diminishing federal footprint comes as adversaries accelerate influence techniques, increasingly using automated and AI-driven tools to tailor messages and mass-produce fake outlets and accounts. Analysts warn that the convergence of reduced centralized capabilities and more sophisticated foreign tradecraft raises the odds that future campaigns will face sharper, faster, and harder-to-trace influence operations. Recent incidents — from large-scale networks of bogus websites to targeted social amplification tied to state actors — illustrate the scale and adaptability of the threat. The strategic calculus for using military cyber capabilities against foreign influence remains politically and legally sensitive, and future administrations may be less willing to employ such measures publicly or secretly. If federal dismantling continues, the burden will shift further to under-resourced local officials and private platforms to spot and mitigate manipulation. The 2026 midterms are likely to be an early test of how adversaries exploit the lower visibility and reduced federal pushback. For policymakers and election managers, the immediate task is to rebuild rapid information sharing and technical assistance while clarifying legal authorities for offensive and defensive cyber actions that intersect with domestic political processes.