U.S. Information‑Sharing Under Strain: Law Sunset, Budget Cuts and Operational Drag Threaten Timely Threat Intelligence

The U.S. framework that underpins cross‑sector cyber threat exchanges is at an inflection point: the 2015 statute that encouraged voluntary sharing and provided legal protections passed its sunset date and is operating only on a short continuing extension, leaving private‑sector risk teams and legal counsels uncertain about liability when they share detailed, contextual breach information. At the same time, the federal agency that coordinates much of this exchange is being tasked with expanding responsibilities even as its budget is being trimmed by roughly $500 million, producing more mission with fewer hands and dollars. That squeeze has operational consequences: legal teams are advising caution, law‑enforcement feeds are increasingly sanitized, and feedback loops that used to return tactical tradecraft and prioritized indicators to vendors and defenders are slowing. The practical cost is immediate: rapidly weaponized flaws — a Fortinet FortiSIEM bug that moved from disclosure to active targeting in days — and supply‑chain flaws in major shipping platforms that could grant intrusive control illustrate how attackers exploit even short windows of uncertainty and delay. Incidents such as targeted operations against distributed energy links in Europe, large delayed detections at U.S. universities, and transnational criminal schemes that draw law enforcement attention further underscore the diversity of threats that rely on speed and context to mitigate damage. Regulators are also tightening incentives: recent enforcement actions against telecom providers and other penalties signal that supervisory bodies will use fines to enforce basic security hygiene, shifting the cost calculus for organizations that fail to act quickly. Meanwhile, automation and broad mandatory reporting rules — including accelerated federal patching mandates like the KEV 50‑day requirement — are increasing indicator and vulnerability volumes while exposing government triage and national databases to backlog and contestability over accuracy. Sector ISACs, closed CISO communities and private third‑party platforms continue to provide trusted, high‑context exchanges and pragmatic workarounds, but their coverage is uneven and they concentrate risk if relied on as a wholesale substitute for national fusion capabilities. Technology and operational remedies exist — behavioral analytics, identity‑centric telemetry, fusion centers that combine classified and commercial feeds, and operational frameworks pushing zero‑trust controls — but they need funding and policy alignment to scale. The market is reacting: investor appetite for hardened, air‑gapped or military‑grade software is growing, reflecting demand for tools that work when centralized sharing frays. Without timely legislative fixes to restore clear legal protections and targeted investment to restore processing capacity, the net effect will be more signals but less confidence that those signals will arrive in time or with the detail needed to avert follow‑on attacks. Policymakers and industry leaders therefore face a binary choice: shore up legal incentives and fusion capacity now to preserve high‑velocity, high‑context sharing, or accept a more fragmented, slower intelligence posture that increases systemic operational risk across critical sectors.